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Abstract—In this review paper we discuss the development of
the minimal self in humans, the behavioural measures indicating
the presence of different aspects of the minimal self, namely, body
ownership and sense of agency, and also discuss robotics research
investigating and developing these concepts in artificial agents.
We investigate possible avenues for expanding the research in
robotics to further explore the development of an artificial
minimal self.
Index Terms—Models of self and agency; Sensorimotor devel-
opment; Machine Learning methods for robot development
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, philosophers and scholars from different
disciplines have been debating the nature of subjective expe-
rience and self-consciousness. A recent account brings back
a phenomenological view on this debate, researching self-
consciousness in its minimal form, that is studying subjective
experiences in their immediate and first-personal ”mineness”.
According to Gallagher, this so-called minimal self refers
to the ”consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of
experience, unextended in time” [1]. Aspects of this minimal
self involve the sense of agency—the sense of the self as
the one causing or generating an action, and the sense of
ownership—the sense of the self as the one subjected to an
experience [1].
This view is distinct from more elaborated aspects of the
self, such as the reflexive self and the narrative self [2]. The
minimal self is closer to a minimalist level of subjective
experience, where the focus is more on the contribution of
the here and now, bodily experience in its construction [3].
Other low-level notions of the self have been proposed in the
literature, such as the proto-self and the immunological self
[4]. Hereby, we do not enter the debate about which of them
constitutes the lowest level of consciousness, as researchers
have not yet converged to an agreement. We commit to the
notion of the minimal self, as this aspect of consciousness is
perhaps the most easily accessible in terms of experimental
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exploration and quantification, and is in fact receiving greater
attention from disciplines such as neuroscience, behavioural
and cognitive sciences, and developmental psychology [5], [6].
Developmental psychologists consider the emergence of a
sense of the self as a key step in cognitive development.
By the second year of life, thus few months after having
acquired basic linguistic skills, toddlers are capable of using
self-referential language such as I, me, my—suggesting that the
acquisition of a self-concept has started earlier. The minimal
self is pre-linguistic and non-conceptual, and is suggested to
unfold already during early developmental stages [7].
This paper presents an interdisciplinary overview of devel-
opmental indices and behavioural measures of the minimal
self. The minimal self is argued to include two main aspects—
a sense of agency and a sense of body ownership—which
are thought to be dependent on an internal body represen-
tation maintained by our brain. This manuscript thus starts
with discussing the development of body representations as a
necessary condition for the emergence of the senses of body
ownership and of agency (section II). Behavioural paradigms
and measures indicating the presence of different aspects of
the minimal self (section III) are analysed. In particular, we
survey studies on self-touch, intentional binding and sensory
attenuation, and the rubber hand illusion.
Alongside the survey on the developmental aspects of the
minimal self and the aforementioned behavioural paradigms
and measures, the main goal of this work is to discuss the
most prominent related studies in robotics. In fact, there is a
growing interest in the developmental robotics community in
implementing processes capable of enabling the experience of
the self in artificial agents. Self-awareness may clearly improve
adaptivity and autonomy in robots and, as a result, reduce
human intervention in their programming. Using robots as
test-beds for studying the minimal self may also shed light
on the cognitive mechanisms underling subjective experience.
Nonetheless, the investigation on the artificial self is still
young and fragmented. This work contributes with identifying
current knowledge gaps and limitations in robotics studies and
with suggesting research directions for the implementation of
behavioural paradigms and measures for the artificial self.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BODY REPRESENTATIONS
In order to effectively interact with the environment, an
embodied agent must form and maintain an internal represen-
tation of its own body situated within the environment. The
term representation may sound controversial. In fact, scholars
usually take either a representationalist or a sensorimotor
position in the philosophical study of bodily awareness (see
[8], section 2, for a review), which may lead to the definition
of body image—the mental representation of the body, consti-
tuted by a combination of sensorimotor experience and social
and psychological concepts about it, and body schema—the
integrated, neural organisation of multimodal stimuli coming
from the different parts of the body, which is essential for
movements. Here, we commit to the latter interpretation of
the term body representation, that is a mapping of the body
in its various modalities (tactile, proprioceptive, visual, motor,
etc.), which is operated in a nonconscious way [9]. The neural
foundation for these representations are the so-called cortical
”homunculi” in the primary sensory (S1) and motor (M1)
cortices. These are neurological representations of the different
anatomical divisions of the body, mapped onto brain areas
charged with sensory and motor processing along S1 and
M1, respectively. These specialized areas are organised in a
somatotopic map where adjacent body parts are represented
closely together. The extent of cortex dedicated to a body
region is not proportional to its size in the body, but rather
to the density of innervation in that specific part (e.g. the
mouth and palms). The establishment of the somatotopic
organisation in S1 and M1 is driven by genetic factors that
are later elaborated through changes in connectivity driven by
embodied interactions both before and after birth [10].
Body representations dynamically integrate information
from different sensory modalities: tactile, proprioceptive,
vestibular, motor, and visual. Studies suggest that the first
sense to emerge in the foetus is the somatosensory sense [11],
where foetuses are in a state of constantly being touched by
their environment. In addition, they engage in self-touch in the
womb: often touching their mouth and feet—body parts that
are highly innervated and therefore most sensitive to touch—
and later on, other parts of the body. The early inclination for
movements and self-touch in parts of the body that are more
sensitive, suggests that the foetus shows a preference towards
movements that induce more informative sensations [12]
From as early as 19 weeks, foetuses can anticipate hand-
to-mouth touch, in opening their mouth prior to contact [13],
[14], indicating the early presence of a sort of sensorimotor
mapping and inference. From 22 weeks, movements seem to
show a form of intentional movement, as they become more
direct dependening on the action goal [15]. Evidence from
neural development studies suggests that even before birth, the
prenatal brain should be able to perceive information arising
from the body, while higher level (multimodal) representations
are possibly formed during the first year after birth, in accor-
dance with the development of association areas [16].
At around 2 months of age, the dominant control of be-
haviours transitions from subcortical to higher order cortical
systems [17]: PET studies show dominant metabolic activity
in subcortical regions and the sensorimotor cortex in infants
under 5 weeks after birth, and by 3 months, an increase in
metabolic activity in the parietal, temporal, and dorsolateral
occipital cortices [18]. Hand-mouth coordination continues to
develop after birth, and from birth to 6 months, infants display
self-touch in a progressive manner throughout their body, from
frequently touching rostral parts such as the head and trunk, to
more caudal parts of the body such as the hips, legs, and feet
later on [19]. The development of goal-directed reaching con-
siderably speeds up at about 5 months of age. Reaching to the
own body is thought to be the product of interactions between
multiple subsystems. The body representation is constructed
through reaching to the body because, in this, the body that
is used to act upon the environment becomes the target itself,
and therefore needs to be modeled. In certain cases, the self-
touch process seems to bypass vision, as when the target is
the face, relying only on somatosensory information.
In summary, genetically predetermined cortical maps—
the ”homunculi” in the primary sensory (S1) and motor
(M1) cortices—facilitate the formation of body representations
through cortical learning of sensorimotor contingencies—
i.e. the statistical connections between sensory and motor
information, and sensorimotor integration—integrating this
information into common percepts. This learning of senso-
rimotor contingencies both drives and is rendered through in-
teractions between brain-body-environment. Specifically, inter-
linked with the neural ontogenetic process (brain maturation,
brain-body interaction), self-exploration (body babbling), self-
touch, and goal-directed reaching are considered the necessary
behavioural conditions that facilitate and reflect this process.
Importantly, this process is thought to be driven and progres-
sively refined by the reduction of prediction errors between
predicted sensory outcomes and motor actions, such that the
agent learns not only to predict the outcomes of its actions on
the environment, but also to predict the (sensory) outcomes of
its (motor) actions on its own body [20], [21].
Rochat [22] describes the idea that infants’ self-exploration,
and interactions with the environment, give rise to the sense
of body ownership through the ”ability to detect intermodal
invariants and regularities in their sensorimotor experience,
which specify themselves as separate entities agent in the en-
vironment.” Therefore, self-exploration (body babbling), self-
touch, and goal-directed reaching are necessary conditions for
the development of motor control and the emergence of body
ownership and sense of agency.
III. BEHAVIOURAL PARADIGMS AND MEASURES OF THE
SELF
A challenging task in the study of the minimal self is to
experimentally quantify the attribution of subjective experi-
ence. A number of behavioural paradigms and attempts for
objective measures have been proposed. This section reviews
the most prominent ones. In particular, we analyse studies on
self-touch, intentional binding and sensory attenuation, and
the rubber hand illusion. There are different reasons why we
consider them important in this study:
A. Self-touch is likely to contribute to the formation of initial
sensorimotor representations, and may therefore consti-
tute one of the very first cues for subjective experience
during early developmental stages.
B. The way the brain interprets action effects has been
shown to differ depending on whether the sensory per-
ception is self- or externally produced, with respect both
to the perceived timing of their occurrence (intentional
binding) and to their intensity (sensory attenuation) [23].
C. The rubber hand illusion has been extensively used as
a paradigm for investigating the mechanisms underlying
the sensorimotor minimal self.
An obvious advantage of conducting robotics research as
test-beds for cognitive models in humans is that using robots
allows unmediated access to the actual process (the algorithm)
and information that is registered and processed in the sys-
tem. In human research, even with advanced neuroimaging
and analysis methods, researchers could only ever have an
approximation of the actual cognitive processes underlying
behaviour. This is especially true when investigating subjective
experiences such as the illusion of a dummy hand or object be-
ing ”mine”, which is measured by observing behaviour or with
subjective self-reports from human participants, whereas the
difficulty lies with developing and most importantly validating
objective measures of cognitive processes (e.g. neuroimaging,
proprioceptive drift). The question of how we can measure a
”subjective” experience in a robot then arises.
A. Self-Touch
How does self-touch relate to body ownership?
Throughout development, the brain must establish links
between sensory and motor maps. Refinement of these links
eventually leads to goal directed actions. Establishing the
basis of this lies in forming sensorimotor contingencies—the
statistical links between sensory and motor information.
These sensorimotor contingencies are thought to be estab-
lished through body babbling where the infant moves its body
in an exploratory manner, whereas the brain initiates actions
and organises the resulting sensory outcomes continuously,
refining its ability to predict sensory outcomes from motor ac-
tions. The process of establishing sensorimotor contingencies
is gradual due to the large amount of information that is being
processed—sensory inputs, motor outputs, and the statistical
correlations between them.
Hoffmann et al. [24] suggest that the most systematic cor-
relations are those that will emerge most easily, and therefore,
the links between motor actions and proprioceptive changes
are presumably the simplest to be extracted, followed by
the links between motor actions and tactile input. Hoffman
[16] suggests that the redundant information arising from
the configurations of self-touch in the proprioceptive-tactile
space facilitates learning the body model in space. He asserts
that pre-natal self-touch likely contributes to the formation of
initial somatosensory representations. Evidence for an early
integration between modalities comes from the instances of
hand-to-mouth anticipation already in the womb [13], [14].
However, the formation of more comprehensive multimodal
body representations probably occurs after birth, from 2-3
months, to include the visual modality and its connections
to tactile-proprioceptive modalities. These are learned through
self-exploration including self-touch within the environment,
which involves learning temporal contingencies, spatial con-
gruence, and redundancies of information coming from differ-
ent sensory modalities.
Rochat et al. [25] provide evidence that early on infants are
capable of discriminating perceptual events—tactile stimuli—
that are either self- or not self-produced. The authors tested
the rooting behaviour—a reflex behaviour that is triggered by
touching the cheek of the infant—in 24h and 4 weeks old
newborns, and reported that infants tended to manifest rooting
responses almost three times more often in response to external
compared to self-stimulation. This suggests that infants pick
up already at birth sensorimotor contingencies (single touch
or double touch) that specify self- versus external stimulation.
In a longitudinal study, Hofmann et al. [24] observed how
infants between 3 and 21 months react to vibrotactile stimula-
tion applied to different body parts. They report responses that
varied between particular movement in the stimulated body
part and successfully reaching and removing the buzzer. They
found an overall developmental progression from general to
specific movement patterns, especially from 3 to 12 months.
Specifically, their results suggest that at 3-4 months, the infant
responds to the buzzer in a non-specific way by moving its
whole body, rather than moving the particular limb that was
stimulated. However, between 4-12 months, the limb-specific
buzzer-oriented reaching develops.
Robotics research
Yamada et al. [26] worked on an embodied brain model of
a human foetus in order to examine the causal link between
sensorimotor experiences through embodied interactions and
cortical learning of body representations. The embodied brain
model was based on anatomical and physiological data and
included a cortex, a spinal circuit, and musculoskeletal body
with sensory receptors for proprioception, tactile perception,
and vision, within a model of a uterine environment. The
results of this study showed that embodied interaction between
brain-body-environment within the womb help to guide the
cortical learning of body representations through regularities
in sensorimotor experiences. Also, the embodied interactions
inside the womb provided a better arena for forming cortical
body representations when compared to extrauterine embodied
interactions. These findings support the notion suggested by
previous studies on animal newborns and preterm infants that
the formation of body representations begins even before birth.
In addition, their findings suggest that embodied interactions
inside the womb set the stage for visual-somatosensory inte-
gration after birth [26].
Expanding on this line of research but in a real robot body,
Noda et al. [27] equipped a humanoid robot with soft skin
sensors and left it engaging in human-robot touch interactions.
The tactile data generated through such interactions were used
by the authors to form a self-organising somatosensory map,
where the feature space was composed by spatially-adjacent
sensor pairs. Computational body representations based on
self-organising maps and multimodal integration through Heb-
bian connections have been proposed by Schillaci et al. [28],
although not in the context of self-touch. Nonetheless, the
model enabled a humanoid robot with predictive capabilities,
fundamental for the study of sensory attenuation processes and
sense of agency (see next section).
In [29] Hoffman et al. targeted the development of self-
organising body representations in the iCub humanoid robot,
learning somatosensory representations of the tactile space.
Hoffmann et al. examined how the iCub robot, equipped with
artificial skin, could form a topographic body representation
by learning from tactile stimulations over the surface of its
skin. They used modified SOMs that restrict the size of the
maximum receptive field (MRF) of neuron groups at the output
layer in order to reproduce the genetically predetermined
organisation of somatotopic cortical maps. The formation of
a tactile map organisation (predetermined with the MRF-
SOM) has been reproduced by using training data obtained
from a ”double-touch” procedure, in which two experimenters
provided tactile stimulation in two different places on the
artificial skin.
Current limitations in robotics research
The authors in [29] focused on mimicking the formation
process of the cortical ”homunculus” in a real robot, de-
termined a-priori. The training data for the model was not
generated by the robot itself, but rather with two methods:
either with simulated data or with a human (or two, for
studying multi-touch) experimenter touching the robot. Indeed,
investigating self-touch in robotics would require the robot
itself generating the behaviour that drives the formation of
the body representation, which would incorporate the work
on proprioceptive representations in [30]. Another possible
expansion could be to implement this in a predictive coding
framework, such that the self-touch behaviour would be driven
by prediction error minimization.
B. Intentional binding and sensory attenuation
How do intentional binding and sensory attenuation relate
to agency?
The human brain interprets action effects differently de-
pending on whether the sensory perception is self-produced or
externally generated, with respect both to the perceived timing
of their occurrence (intentional binding) and to their intensity
(sensory attenuation) [23].
In 2002, Haggard et al. studied the perceived time of in-
tentional actions and their sensory consequences, while inves-
tigating action awareness [31]. Interestingly, they found that
voluntary actions and their effects are perceived as closer in
time, compared to the perceived time shift between involuntary
movements—induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS)—followed by the same effects. Specifically, subjects
perceived voluntary movements as occurring later than when
they actually occurred, and their sensory consequences as
occurring earlier. This effect, known as intentional binding,
has attracted the attention of many scholars interested in
shedding light on the nature of the sense of agency (see
[32] for a review). Engel and Singer reported several pieces
of evidence from animal and human studies suggesting that
temporal dynamics in neuronal activity may be critically
involved in conscious states, in particular that synchronisation
may be involved in the generation and maintenance of sensory
awareness [5].
Sensory attenuation refers to the partial cancellation, or
reduction, of the perceived intensity of the effects of a self-
initiated action. Several studies show similar effects. Blake-
more et al., for instance, found that self-produced tactile
stimulation was perceived as less intense compared to when
the same stimulus was produced externally [20]. In the ex-
periment, participants moved the arm of a robot with their
left hand in order to produce tactile stimuli on their right
hand via a second robot. The authors found that varying
the delay between the movements of the left hand and the
resulting movements producing the tactile stimuli on the right
hand, and varying the degree of trajectory perturbation all had
an effect on the rating of tickliness sensations. Participants
perceived the stimuli produced by more delayed and more
perturbated movements as more tickling, suggesting that self-
produced movements attenuate resulting sensations and that a
prerequisite for this attenuation is that stimuli and their causal
motor commands correspond in time and space.
Robotics research
In [33], Michel et al. experimented the incremental learning
of characteristic time delay inherent in the action-perception
loop from a sequence of random arm motions within the visual
field in a humanoid robot. Interestingly, the study showed that
the learned time delay can be successfully used to identify
own body parts in the visual field.
Lang, Schillaci and Hafner [34] studied how a humanoid
robot can learn, through a self-exploration behaviour, the
sensory outcomes (in the visual domain) of self-generated
movements. The sensorimotor experience gathered during this
process was used as training data for a deep convolutional
neural network that mapped proprioceptive and motor data
(e.g. initial arm joint positions and applied motor commands)
onto the visual outcomes of these actions. The authors then
used such a forward model in two experiments. First, for
generating visual predictions of self-generated movements,
which were compared to actual visual perceptions and then
used to compute a prediction error. The system generated
higher prediction errors when an external subject was per-
forming actions in front of the robot, compared to situations in
which the robot was observing only itself doing the same arm
movements. The authors also showed how predictions can be
used to attenuate self-generated movements, and thus create
enhanced visual perceptions, where the sight of objects—
originally occluded by the robot body—was still maintained.
This suggests that similar processes may shed light also on
the understanding of the sense of object permanence and of
short term memory systems in humans.
In [28], Schillaci et al. presented a biologically inspired
model for learning multimodal body representations in arti-
ficial agents in the context of learning and predicting robot
ego-noise, i.e. the auditory noise produced by the robot’s
motors while it moves. The authors performed an ego-noise
attenuation experiment, which showed the effects in the ego-
noise suppression performance of coherent and incoherent
proprioceptive and motor information passed as inputs to the
predictive process implemented by a forward model. In line
with the aforementioned studies, the experiments showed that
ego-noise attenuation was more pronounced when the robot
was the owner of the action. Sensory attenuation was less
pronounced when the robot (not moving itself) was listening
to a simulated moving robot, as the incongruence of the
proprioceptive and motor information with the perceived ego-
noise generated larger prediction errors.
Other robotics studies can be found in the literature imple-
menting top-down processes for interpreting bottom-up sen-
sory streams. An example is the interesting work of Jun Tani
[35], who implemented an incremental learning system based
on recurrent neural networks and self-organising networks
that evolves by showing steady and unsteady phases. The
author explains these fluctuations as a result of the interaction
between top-down and bottom-up processes, and makes a
parallel between them and phenomenological observations.
Current limitations in robotics research
For many years, sense of agency has been measured using
explicit self-reported judgements (e.g. [36]). However, the self-
report approach has limitations, as it is sensitive to different
biases [37]. Moreover, this is not a feasible approach in current
robotics technologies if we look at it from a phenomenological
perspective, as the only level of judgement available in robots
comes at the point when the experimenter observes and
interprets the internal states of the machine.
Tani [35], for instance, compares the dynamical structure of
the system created in his robotic study to the structure of the
”self”, and observes that ”the ”self” is made aware when the
unsteady phase appears in the course of the time-development
of the system”. Although we recognise the quality of the pro-
posed model, we believe that similar statements on subjective
mind and self in robots—as reported in the paper—are prone
to criticisms about their objective validity.
In the work of Michel et al. on learning time delays in
action-perception loops in humanoid robots [33], the learning
mechanism was simply looking for regularities in the delays
between the motor activations and the detections of moving
objects on the screen. The authors performed a basic process-
ing of the visual input, which was at any stage mapped to
other sensory modalities (e.g. to proprioceptive modalities).
The authors pointed out the need for a more robust method
of visual recognition of the robot body. However, we find
as more critical the lack of multimodal integration, which
as to the proposed study consisted only in the analysis of
the timestamps of intermodal events. In fact, as discussed
in section II, the development of multimodal body repre-
sentations is a necessary condition for the emergence of a
minimal self. Further works on intentional binding effects in
the investigation of sense of body ownership and of agency in
robots should thus consider also this aspect.
In general, there is a need for further investigation on the
intentional binding action effects, especially in robotics. In
fact, there are studies [38] showing that motor prediction
seems to not modulate that, casting doubts on the assumption
that intentional binding of action effects is linked to an internal
forward predictive process. These studies suggest that just the
temporal control of a stimulus, by means of a voluntary action,
might be sufficient to trigger the binding effect.
Regarding the sensory attenuation measure, most of the
robotics studies addressing this topic (e.g. [28], [34]) adopt
comparator computation models for sensory prediction and
attenuation. Nonetheless, more recent probabilistic computa-
tional proposals—such as the predictive coding framework
described in the next section—would represent a more bio-
logically plausible approach.
C. Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI)
How does the RHI relate to body ownership?
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) [39], along with other body
ownership illusions, is a widely used paradigm for investi-
gating the mechanisms underlying the (sensorimotor) minimal
self. In the rubber hand illusion, an observer sees a dummy
hand receiving touch (e.g. brush strokes) while at the same
time receiving tactile stimulation on their real hidden hand at
the same location. This usually elicits an illusory experience of
sensing the stimulation on the dummy hand [39], [40], and as a
result, incorporating the fake hand as a part of the observer’s
own body [41], [42]. This effect was found to be reflected
behaviourally as a fear response when the fake hand is being
threatened [43], [44] or in perceiving the location of the real
hand as closer towards where the dummy hand is located (a
”proprioceptive drift”) [39], [41], suggesting that the dummy
hand is treated by the brain as part of the own body as a result
of the multisensory stimulation [42]. These illusory effects are
thought to be an indicator for the presence of multimodal,
integrated body representations. RHI studies show that both
top-down and bottom-up processes influence the embodiment
of the dummy hand. For example, top-down expectations about
the appearance of the human hand—stronger illusory effects
are experienced when the dummy hand closely resembles
a human hand—are thought to result from internal body
representations, and bottom-up sensory inputs where illusory
effects are dependent on spatiotemporal congruence of the
stimulation and on the proximity of the dummy hand to the
real hand [41].
A predictive coding account of the RHI
Different explanations to the RHI effects have been pro-
posed in the cognitive neuroscience literature. The predictive
coding [21] account, that is recently receiving great support,
proposes that this results from the fact that, to reduce un-
certainty, the brain makes inferences about causes of sensory
events in a probabilistic-Bayesian manner: prior beliefs (bias)
represented in internal models generate predictions about
sensory input (top-down). When predictions contradict actual
sensory input, this generates ”prediction errors” that propagate
up the hierarchy—to unimodal, multimodal, representational
areas (bottom-up). The contradiction results in ”surprise” that
needs to be ”explained away” by updating the model, thus
reducing the prediction error (see [45] for a review on the
minimal self within the predictive coding framework).
During the RHI, the co-occurrence of the visual input that
comes from observing touch on the dummy hand together with
the tactile input that comes from the stimulation of the real
hand, evokes—according to the predictive coding account—
a prediction error (or surprise), because this spatiotemporal
congruence is not predicted by the initial generative forward
model. According to [46], the illusion is induced when the
probability of the dummy hand being ”me” exceeds the
probability of the real hand being ”one’s own”, given the
sensory input. If the prediction error can be explained away
by adjusting the body model to incorporate the dummy hand,
then the RHI will be induced. The explanation that the dummy
hand is ”mine” is equivalent to mean that the visual and tactile
perceptual inputs occur at the same location and arise from a
common cause.
RHI and sense of agency: ”passive” versus ”active” RHI
In the classic RHI paradigm, the participants are not allowed
to move their hand. It has been observed that if they do move
their hand, and they do not observe congruent movement in the
dummy hand, then the illusion will be immediately abolished.
The proposed explanation is that, as the participant moved
their hand in order to ”test” the body ownership of the not
moving dummy hand, the prediction error cannot resolve in
favour of perceiving the dummy hand as one’s own [45]. This
classic RHI paradigm is therefore named as ”passive”, and
while it induces the illusion of body ownership, the effect it
has on the sense of agency can not be directly examined.
In ”active” RHI, in addition to the concurrent multisensory
stimulation, the participant also moves their real hand while
observing a dummy hand that moves along it [47], [48]. In this
version of the RHI paradigm (which could also be induced in a
virtual environment), the illusion of embodying a dummy hand
(or object) is induced as a result of the congruence between
the participant’s motor actions and the sensory outcomes of
said actions, namely, the perception of the movement of
the dummy hand, rather than as a result of the multimodal
sensory integration alone. Also of note, in this case, the visual
properties of the dummy hand or object, do not necessarily
have to resemble those of a real human hand [47], [49]. In
”active” RHI, one can directly manipulate the sense of agency,
or even possibly disassociate agency from body ownership
[48]. In line with this, there is evidence that body ownership
or embodiment of an object, even one which is anatomically
implausible, can still be successfully induced given systematic
synchrony between visual input when observing the object
and one’s own movement. In [50], Ma and Hommel induced
in a virtual setting body ownership of virtual 2-D shapes (a
virtual balloon changing in size, and a virtual square changing
in size and color) when the changes in the 2-D shapes were
systematically congruent with participants’ actions. In addition
to the concurrent multisensory stimulation, the induced illusion
of body ownership is thought to be cultivated by the congru-
ence between predicted sensory outcomes of motor actions
and the actual sensory input, pointing to the role of agency
in body ownership. This is reminiscent of the manner in
which the sense of body ownership emerges in the ontogenetic
developmental process.
In another study in a virtual setting [49], Ma and Hommel
manipulated the similarity of the object-to-be-embodied (end-
effector) to the real hand, the synchrony between stimula-
tion or movement of the end-effector and the stimulation
or movement of participant’s real hand, and the degree of
agency, operationalized by the level of control over the end-
effector. They found that agency strongly effected synchrony-
induced body ownership, but not similarity. However, both
similarity and agency induced a bias towards body ownership
of the end-effector. This shows that agency contributes to body
ownership.
Robotics research
When humans are subjected to the RHI, they show a percep-
tual drift in the location of the real hand toward the dummy
hand, which suggests an update in the body representation.
Using a multisensory robotic arm, Hinz et al. [51] replicated
these drifting patterns in both human and robot experiments
with the classic (”passive”) RHI paradigm. The learning and
estimation algorithm [52] used in the study was based on
the framework of predictive coding [21]. Specifically, Lanillos
and Cheng [52] developed a method for integrating different
sources of information (tactile, visual, and proprioceptive) that
drives the robot priors to infer its body configuration. This
computational perceptual model enables a multisensory robot
to learn, make inferences, and update its body configuration
from its sensors. They modeled the robot body estimation as a
process of minimizing the prediction error between the body
configuration ”belief” (prediction) and the observed posterior,
and minimizing the variational free energy [21] by using the
sensory prediction error. Using the algorithm in [52], Hinz
et al. [51] showed that body configuration estimation can be
done through minimization of prediction error as one process
that involves both predictive coding and causal inference. The
results from the human and robot experiments suggest that
the perceived locations of both the real and the dummy hand
drift to a common location between them. In human data,
in fact, illusion scores (self-report) were not correlated with
the proprioceptive drift, suggesting that the drift and body-
ownership illusions are related, but different processes [53].
Current limitations in robotics research
Many studies can be found in the literature which use
robotic or virtual hands in active RHI experiments, that is
in scenarios where participants move their real hand while
observing a dummy robotic or virtual hand that moves along
it. However, the investigation on RHI experienced by artificial
systems is very scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the work
of Hinz et al. [51] is the only study on replicating the rubber
hand illusion on a robot.
Another concern is related to the ”proprioceptive drift” as
the classic ”objective measure” for the RHI, as used in the
experiment mentioned above [51]. Both the human data from
this study, as well as previous work in humans [53], [54],
failed to find a correlation between the proprioceptive drift
and the self-report of the participants, casting doubt on the
validity of the proprioceptive drift as an objective measure for
body ownership. Further investigation is therefore suggested.
Also, after reproducing the classic, ”passive” RHI in a robot
using free energy minimization [51], it could be suggested to
examine the algorithm in an ”active” RHI experimental setup,
which would allow to distinctly examine sense of agency in a
robot apart from body ownership.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This manuscript presented an interdisciplinary overview of
developmental indices and behavioural measures of the min-
imal self. The fundamental role of the development of body
representation in the emergence of body ownership and sense
of agency has been discussed. This work also addressed the
task of experimentally quantifying the attribution of subjective
experience, and surveyed a number of behavioural paradigms
and measures indicating the presence of different aspects of
the minimal self, namely self-touch, intentional binding and
sensory attenuation, and the rubber hand illusion.
Self-touch is likely to contribute to the formation of initial
sensorimotor representations, and may therefore constitute one
of the very first cues for subjective experience during early
developmental stages. Moreover, the way in which our brain
interprets action effects has been shown to differ depending on
whether the sensory perception is self-produced or externally
triggered, with respect both to the perceived timing of their
occurrence (intentional binding) and to their intensity (sensory
attenuation). Finally, we addressed the rubber hand illusion as
it has been extensively used as a paradigm for investigating
the mechanisms underlying the sensorimotor minimal self.
We reviewed the most prominent studies addressing these
paradigms and measures from the literature in neuroscience,
cognitive and developmental sciences. For each of these top-
ics, we presented related robotics studies. Equipping robots
with self-awareness and studying the possibility of subjective
experience in artificial systems is, in fact, of high interest for
the cognitive and developmental robotics communities. This
manuscript contributed to this quest by identifying current
knowledge gaps and limitations in robotics. In the next section,
we conclude this work by highlighting the most critical gaps
and by suggesting further research directions.
Further research directions in robotics
The development of multimodal body representations has
been discussed as fundamental in the emergence of self-
awareness. Further robotics research should address the im-
plementation of multimodal integration through online de-
velopmental processes. Current research on self-touch and
on self-organisation of somatosensory maps in robots do not
explicitly consider the active role that the robot should have in
the generation of sensorimotor experience. We therefore en-
courage further experimentation considering self-exploration
behaviours in such a developmental process.
Recent proposals on predictive processes represent promis-
ing research lines that go beyond their higher level of biologi-
cal plausibility. Prediction error minimization processes could
result in intelligent robot exploration behaviours, where the
intrinsic motivation of reducing uncertainty would generate
artificial curiosity and goal-directed behaviours—both prereq-
uisites for motor and cognitive development.
The intentional binding effects and sensory attenuation
processes are recognised by the neuroscience and cognitive
science communities as important measures for the definition
of self-boundaries. Current studies, however, mostly focus on
explicit judgement from human participants. This self-report
approach is clearly not feasible in robotics. Nonetheless, robots
allow experimenters to inspect their internal states, the flowing
sensorimotor data and the predictive processes implemented
by their computational models. These data is for obvious
reasons not accessible in humans. Robots represent, therefore,
promising tools for the investigation of intentional binding
effects and sensory attenuation processes. Beside encourag-
ing further investigations in robotics, we also suggest more
experimentations considering the effects of the developmental
path in the performance of such measures. In particular, how
do developmental stages—for instance, the levels of multi-
modal integration reached after a certain stage of sensorimotor
exploration—affect predictive performances, and consequently
sensory attenuation and intentional binding effects? Can this
be linked to stages in early development of the minimal self
in humans?
The RHI represents a well-established paradigm to measure
subjective experience in humans, and it makes therefore very
much sense to extend this to the investigation of subjective
experiences in robots. Further usage of this measure in the
study of the artificial self is thus encouraged. In particular, we
suggest testing the ”active” RHI paradigm in robots in order to
investigate also the sense of agency. Moreover, similar effects
as the ones mentioned above could be studied for the RHI
paradigm. Further studies could address whether and how the
perceptual drift measure is affected by the developmental stage
in which the agent finds themselves.
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